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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
BUDGET SYSTEM, INC., ~ 
Plaintiff arnd Respondent 
vs. 
BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE ' 
PLAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9224 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge 
BRIEF O·F 'l~HE RESPO·NDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an action by respondent to enjoin appellant 
from using the word ''Budget'' in its finance business in 
the Salt Lake City area. The trial court granted the 
injunction. Damages were waived by respondent. 
Appellant in its brief raises four points wherein it is 
argued that the trial court erred. All four points attack 
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Findings of Fact 11 and 12. R. 187) Their position 
is that the court erred in making these Findings, and the 
position of respondent is that both such Findings are 
supported by competent evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Hugh Barker and wife commenced a small loan 
business in Salt Lake County in 1928 under the name 
and style of ''Budget System'' and operated such busi-
ness continuously as individuals or as a corporation. In 
early 1957 they incorporated the present respondent as 
''Budget System, Inc.'' Shortly thereafter they entered 
into an option agreement with American Co-Op Finance 
Company for the purchase of all the stock of Budget 
System, Inc. American Co-Op exercised the option in 
the summer of 1957, and has operated this corporation 
continuously since that time. 
The holding company of appellant formed a corpo-
ration called ''Budget Loan and Finance Company'' in 
1948. They operated under this name for a short time 
in 1949, after which no business was done with the pub-
lic in the name of Budget Loan and Finance until the 
latter part of 1958, at which time a. finance business being 
operated in the name of "Credit Finance" changed its 
name to ''Budget Loan and Finance Plan'' and actively 
solicited business in that name. 
After the name change referred to above, large neon 
signs were erected on the premises of appellant located on 
the southwest corner of State Street and 8th South Street, 
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one-half block to the north of respondent's offices. The 
change in name, signs and other advertising caused the 
trouble complained of by respondent, the nature of which 
'vill be set out in more detail in the argument herein. 
Personnel representing appellant discussed pur-
ehasing the name ''Budget System'' with the Barkers 
and officers of Budget System for ten or eleven years 
prior to the time of trial. The first such offer was made by 
lVIr. Charles Offer, president of Budget Finance Plan, in 
1948. (R. 42-43) After negotiations had started with 
American Co-Op for the purchase of Budget System stock, 
Mr. Gibbs, resident manager of appellant, inquired as to 
the possibility of purchasing the name ''Budget Systern'' 
for $10,000.00. (R. 43-44) After the stock purchase, 1\fr. 
Gibbs discussed such a purchase with Mr. Seegmiller. 
(R. 96) Such discussions were continued after the action 
was filed. (R. 97) The fact such discussions took place is 
confirmed by Mr. Gibbs. (R. 136) 
In negotiations with Mr. Barker for the purchase of 
Budget System stock, officers of respondent were told by 
Mr. Barker that he had recently had an offer to purchase 
the name ''Budget System'' from appellant for $10,000.00. 
Because of this offer, there was inserted in the option to 
purchase the stock of Budget System, Inc., a provision 
that Mr. Barker would retain an option to repurchase the 
name ''Budget System'' or ''Budget System, Inc.,'' for 
the sum of $6,000.00 prior to August 27, 1957. (Ex. P-1) 
There was an oral understanding in connection with this 
option granted Mr. Barker that if he made such a sale of 
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the name to appellant for a sum in excess of $6,000.00, 
then such excess would be divided equally between Mr. 
Barker and the purchasers of the stock of Budget Sys-
tem. ( R. 49-50) 
In the sale of the stock of Budget System by Barker, 
the name ''Budget System'' was assigned a Yalue of 
$6,000.00 and the seller warranted that he was the lawful 
owner of the name ''Budget System'' and the good will 
related thereto, and had the exclusive right to its use in 
the State of Utah. (Ex. P-1) 
The important evidence on this subject is contained 
in a letter from J. S. Monosson, house counsel for Budget 
Finance Plan (the holding company of appellant) writ-
ten December 5, 1957, to persons who purchased the 
Budget System, Inc., stock. In this letter counsel recites 
the fact that it was his understanding that there had been 
a sale of the office of Budget System in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. I-Ie states that his organization has tV\70 subsidiary 
corporations doing a finance business in Salt Lake City 
under the name of Credit Finance Plan, and continues by 
saying that his organization has not been able to utilize 
the name used by other offices in his chain, i. e., Budget 
Finance Plan, Budget Loan and Finance, by reason of 
the fact that the name ''Budget System'' 'Yas preempted 
by Mr. Barker in Salt Lake City, Utah. He then goes on 
to ask consent to the use of the name ''Budget Finance 
Plan" in Utah. (Ex. P-11) 
During 1949 when Budget Finance and Loan started 
business at 802 South State Street in that name, consid-
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erable confusion resulted. Mr. Barker characterizes thib 
confusion in the following language : 
''When they first came in it nearly drove us nuts 
on telephone calls and that sort of disturbance ... 
"\V e had a lot of misdirected mail.'' ( R. 37) 
This confusion resulted in his threatening suit and 
making complaints to the banking department, so appel-
lant's representatives desisted from the use of the na1ne 
"Budget" in their finance business. (R. 38) 
Confusion by reason of the similarity of the two 
names commenced in January and February, 1959, as tes-
tified to by Mrs. Nichols (R. 79), Mr. Smith (R. 64-67). 
Both Mr. Gibbs and Mr. Seegmiller, managers of the 
respective finance companies, testified that the confusion 
increased as soon as the signs were erected on the offices 
of appellant. (R. 90, 129) 
Prior to trial, the outstandings of respondent were 
over $100,000.00. A stock registration had been approved 
for the public sale of stock of American Co-Op Finance 
at the time of trial, and it was reliably anticipated that 
more than $250,000.00 would be available from this stock 
issue and bank credit for use in respondent's business in 
the year 1960. To put this money out in loans would re-
quire advertising. Advertising and credit policies of 
respondent had been interfered with because advertising 
money spent by respondent under existing conditions 
would help appellant more than respondent because of the 
former's corner location. (R. 109) (Ex. P-16) 
None of the foregoing facts are disputed. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 11 AND 12 ARE SUP-
PORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND 
BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 11 AND 12 ARE SUP-
PORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND 
BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
There is no dispute with regard to any of the Find-
ings of Fact made and entered by the trial court except 
Findings of Fact number 11 and number 12. They 
provide: 
'' 11. That the use of the word 'Budget' in the 
name of defendant since November 1958 has 
caused and will continue to cause confusion and 
deception to the public in the Salt Lake City area 
among present and potential customers therein. 
That the similarity of said names is a deceptive 
use by defendant, an unfair trade practice, and has 
and will result in probable damage to plaintiff's 
business. 
'' 12. That the use of said name has \Yorked to 
the injury of plaintiff in an undeterminable amount 
and if continued will result in further and in-
creased prejudice to plaintiff's business. That 
plaintiff herein waives the allowance of pecuniary 
damage herein. '' 
Appellant contends: (a) that the use of the two names 
and businesses located as they are resulted in no con-
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fusion, and (b) that the word ''Budget'' is a generic term 
and, therefore, not entitled to be protected by one organi-
zation as against its use by another organization engag·ed 
in similar activities. 
Respondent's position is, briefly, that they proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence two facts which entitled 
them to the relief granted by the trial court. These facts 
are: 
(a) That shortly after the use by appellant of 
the word ''Budget'' in its name confusion developed 
and would continue to exist by reason of such use of 
the word "Budget." 
(b) That the word "Budget" when used in the 
name of competing businesses is of a class which 
entitled the first user to its exclusive use. 
The evidence supporting the two facts mentioned 
above will now be presented separately. 
(a) THAT SHORTLY AFTER THE USE BY AP-
PELLANT OF THE WORD "BUDGET" IN 
ITS NAME CONFUSION DEVELOPED AND 
WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST BY REASON 
OF SUCH USE OF THE WORD "BUDGET". 
A log was kept of the misdirected calls received at the 
office of respondent. (Exhibit P-8) This log, when consid-
ered with the testimony of Mrs. Nichols, stands uncontra-
dicted and is that there were 108 instances of misdirected 
calls and customers during the 22 working days of July, 
1959. This office girl also testified that in each case of 
misdirection it became necessary to 
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1. Check their Cardex system. 
2. Check their loan pockets. 
3. Check Mr. Barker's old accounts. 
4. Render a lengthy explanation involving the 
miXup. 
5. Return payments, etc., to appellant by mail and 
personal delivery. (R. 79) 
Mr. Smith, the manager in the early part of 1959, 
testified that there were a lot of misdirected phone calls, 
mail payments and customers. (R. 64) Also that one mis-
directed phone call required he or his assistant to exam-
ine the complete filing system, current, past, and back into 
Barker's records. (R. 64) 
Mr. Gibbs, the manager of appellant, admits this 
existing confusion by testifying as follows: 
'' Q. Has there been in your experience any con-
fusion between your organization and Budget 
System since you started doing business the 
latter part of 1958 in the name of 'Budget 
I_Joan and Finance'~ 
''A. Well, there is no confusion other than the 
routine things that we haYe mentioned up 
until the time \Ye put up the signs as I stated 
in my deposition. 
'' Q. And did confusion develop then~ 
"A. Yes, it did." (R. 129) 
'' Q. As you said before, any confusion that has re-
sulted in the office of the Budget System or in 
your office you feel is because of the use of 
the two names 'Budget' in both institutions' 
names~ 
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".L\. That and their location." (R. 130) 
The latter quotation was made during the taking of 
Mr. Gibbs' deposition. 
Mr. Seegmiller outlined the procedures used by the 
various finance companies before making loans to pros-
pective customers. (R. 88) In the loan applications the 
prospective borrower is required to indicate any finance 
company that has made such borrower loans in the past, 
and also any finance companies to which he was presently 
in debt. The finance company then investigated directly 
by telephone with each finance company appearing in the 
application and in so doing they used the membership of 
the Lender's Exchange. (Ex. P-14) On Exhibit P-14 re-
spondent company is nearer the top of this schedule of 
local finance companies than is appellant which would 
account for large numbers of misdirected telephone calls. 
This would be expected to be increased with the expan-
sion of the business of both institutions. 
The colored photos, Exhibits P-3, P-4, P-5 and P-6, 
show the illuminated signs on both sides of appellant's 
building and indicate the extent that the word "Budget" 
is emphasized as compared with the other V\70rds in the 
full title of appellant. 
Exhibit D-9 indicates the same facts with regard to 
respondent. 
Confusion of any and all types is to be expected by 
reason of these similar activities emphasizing the same 
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word in their titles operating a mere 100 yards from each 
other. 
(b) THAT TI-IE WORD "BUDGET" WHEN USED 
IN THE NAME OF COMPETING BUSINESS-
ES IS OF A CLASS WHICII El~TITLED THE 
FIRST USER TO ITS EXCLUSIVE USE. 
The thinking of appellant's officers with regard to the 
significance of the word ''Budget'' seems to have changed 
quite suddenly. For nearly ten years prior to the trial 
of this action, negotiations had been off and on with 
regard to the purchase of respondent's name for a sub-
stantial amount of money. (R. 43-44, 39, 48-50, 96, 97, 114, 
136, Ex. P-1, P-2, P-11) This kind of talk was still being 
maintained after the suit was filed. (R. 97) Finally, 
appellant's legal counsel, as late as December 5, 1957, 
quite candidly admits that those in control of appellant's 
organization have been unable to utilize the name used by 
other offices in their chain by reason of the fact that the 
name "Budget System" was preempted by Mr. Barker in 
Salt Lake City. (Ex. P-11) "Budget" is the only com-
mon word in the name of respondent and in the name of 
appellant's organization. This attorney is conversant 
with the meaning of words. The word ''preempted'' is de-
fined by Webster as ''a taking beforehand to the exclu-
si~n of others.'' This admission of the general counsel for 
appellant coincides with the decision reached by the trial 
court and should conclude this matter. 
The evidence conclusively indicates that appellant's 
representative were of the opinion that the name was of 
such a character as to be subject to protection. Respond-
10 
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ent 's testimony presented by Mr. Barker indicates that 
this name was protected for 32 years in the Salt Lake area 
successfully and at the time he sold, it was worth a sub-
stantial sum of money for which he was paid. (R. 39) 
Respondent, as early as 1949, was successfully stopped by 
Mr. Barker from using the word "Budget" in its name. 
(R. 38) To all intents and purposes representatives of 
appellant found that they could not successfully use the 
word "Budget" while Mr. Barker was connected with 
Budget System, but after he parted with it, concluded that 
they could get away with it while it was under the control 
of respondent. 
The cases, and particularly those decided more re-
cently, fully support the result reached by the trial court. 
The most significant and carefully considered decision is 
contained in an opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
the case of Cazierv. Economy Cash Stores, Inc., 228 P. 2d 
436 (1951). The two names involved in this action were 
''Economy Grocery'' and ''Economy Cash Stores, Inc.,'' 
located in Burley, Idaho. The action was brought to re-
strain defendant from doing business under its trade 
name on the ground of confusing similarity to that of 
plaintiff. The trial court enjoined defendant from so 
doing but the injunction was held to be too broad and the 
Supreme Court of Idaho enjoined defendant from using 
the word ''Economy'' in its name. The writer has found. 
no case where more similarity of words involved could 
be found than ''Economy'' and ''Budget.'' There were 
not as many misdirected matters in the Economy case as 
in the case at bar. Plaintiff had been doing business for 
11 
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more than 18 years prior to the action. The evidence 
showed that after defendant had commenced using the 
name, plaintiff experienced some difficulty in receiving 
merchandise which was misdirected between the two. Each 
party received letters which were intended for the other 
and advertising was confusing. Many people thought 
plaintiff owned both stores and payments were misdi-
rected. Defendant presented six assignments of error 
which were substantially the same as those presented by 
appellant here. These were : 
(1) The fai1ure of the Court to find that busi-
ness of plaintiff suffered by defendant's use of its 
name. 
(2) Failure to find that the public would be 
imposed upon. 
(3) Failure to find that defendant had at-
tempted or was attempting to palm off its goods. 
( 4) Failure to find that the trade name of 
plaintiff had acquired a secondar~T meaning. 
( 5) Failure to find that defendant 'vas en-
gaged in unfair competition. 
( 6) That a finding of confusion alone is not 
sufficient to support a judgment for injunctive 
relief. 
Each of the six objections made by defendant in this 
. Idaho case was made by appellant in the trial court or in 
this court. The Idaho court laid down the following rules 
of law with regard to each: 
( 1) That in this type of case it is not necessary to 
support an injunction to show that the first trader suf-
12 
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fcred damage. It cites Bernstein v. Friedman, 160 P. 
2d 227, wherein the Wyoming Supreme Court states: 
''The cases seem to be clear that it is not nec-
essary to show actual damages in cases like that 
before us.'' 
The Court adopts the language in La;nahan. v. John 
Kissell & Son, CCA, 135 F. 899 at 903. 
"It must be apparent that in a case such as 
before us, it would be ordinarily difficult to prove 
actual damages, and a plaintiff would be substan-
tially remediless, if he could not be protected by 
an injunction except where actual damages in dol-
lars and cents were sho,vn.'' 
Other authority is also cited. 
(2) ''It is not necessary to show that the public would 
be imposed upon.'' Numerous cases cited. 
(3) It is not necessary that plaintiff prove that de-
fendant was attempting to palm off its goods as those of 
plaintiff. 
''Where there is no showing in the record of 
palming off, its absence does not undermine the 
finding of unfair competition. Champion Spark 
Plug Company v. Sanders, 331 U. S. 125, 67 S. Ct. 
1136, 91 L. Ed. 1386.'' 
( 4) Plaintiff by long use had acquired a secondary 
meaning of a trade name. 
"What constitutes secondary meaning of a 
trade name is a question of fact. 52 Am. Jur. 557, 
Sec. 77; 150 A. L. R. 1082. The court did find 
that respondent had used his trade name in the 
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particular area since the month of September, 
1930, and that the appellant had used its cor-
porate name in the same trade area since June 5, 
1948. Where a p-arty uses a trade name for a long 
time it is evidence, though not conclusive, of the 
secondary mean.ing of the term. Bernstein v. Fried-
man, supra; see also 150 A. L. R. 1087, at page 
1089. The court, by implication, at least, made a 
finding that the respondent's trade name had 
acquired a secondary meaning. National Shoe Cor-
poration v. National Shoe 1\ifg. Co., Inc., supra." 
''Evidence of actual confusion and deception 
on the pa,rt of customers is not readily available, 
often difficult to sec-u.re and is not always neces-
sary where the similarity of names in itself s~tg­
gests confusion. Gehl v. Hebe Co., 7 Cir., 276, 
F. 271." (Emphasis supplied) 
(5-6) Confusion is a question of fact. Cases cited. 
''A showing of confttsion,. present or probable, 
is sufficient to justify injunctive relief where a 
trade na.me has acquired a secondary meaning. In 
the case of American Home Benefit Ass 'n., Inc. vs. 
United American Benefit Ass'n, supra, this court 
held that it is not necessary that the complainant 
show specific in.sta;nces where confusion, or de-
ception, or both, as a basis of injunctive relief; it is 
sttfficient to show probable confusion or that the 
use of a deceptively similar name is likely to lead 
to confusion. This court in so holding cited from 
63 C. J., pp. 396 and 397, as follows: '' * * * in 
order to make out a case of unfair competition, it 
is not necessary to sho\v that any person has been 
actually deceived by defendant's conduct and led 
to purchase his goods in the belief that they are the 
goods of plaintiff or to deal with defendant think-
ing he was dealing with plaintiff; it is sufficient to 
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show that such deception. will be the natural and 
probable result of defendant's a.cts." 
''The cases are very n.umerous where relief ha.s 
been afforded upon the ground of unfa.ir compe·-
tition agaJinst a deceptive use of generic or descrip-
tive na.mes and ma.rks, personal, geographical, 
corpora.te, and other names, none of which are 
ca.pable of exclusive appropriation as technical 
trademarks.'' 
The more recent decisions hold that in a case of this 
kind, i. e. involving similarity in name, actual compe-
tition between the parties involved need not be shown. 
148 A.L.R. 12. 
Examples where injunctions were granted are Lin·-
coln Motor Compan.y v. Lincoln Auto Company, 44 F. 2d 
812; Investors Syndicate v. Hughes, 38 NE 2d 754, Ill. In 
this case the court stated that the more modern test has 
been "less emphasis on competition and more on confu-
sion." Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Stand-
ard Surety atnd C. Company, 53 F. 2d 119, where it was 
held the names were confusingly similar, therefore objec-
tionable, even though there was no competition because 
they were engaged in different lines of in.surance. The lat-
ter case is particularly significant in view of the introduc-
tion of the classified section of the telephone book where 
counsel took the position that "budget" was in the same 
category with "continental" and "general." It would 
seem that ''standard'' more nearly conforms to these 
terms than does ''budget.'' 
15 
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There is an annotation in 66 A. L. R. 949 entitled 
''Protection of business or trading corporation against 
use of same or similar name by another corporation.'' 
At 66 A. L. R. 954 the rule is stated : ''It is generally 
held in accordance with the rule applied in the case of 
trade names that if there is sufficient similarity to de-
ceive, it is not necessary to establish a fraudulent intent 
in the use of the name.'' 
At 66 A. L. R. 967 the rule with relation to closely 
related lines is stated to be: ''Where the companies are 
engaged in lines of business which form a part of the same 
general commercial field, and are so closely related that 
simulation of a name by one is likely to result in injury to 
the other, it has been held that the general rule does not 
apply, and that __ relief will be gran-ted, even though 
the comp·anies are not, strictly speaking, engaged in 
competition.'' 
Names of cases supporting this rule are: Long's 
Hat Stores Corporation v. Long's Clothes, 231 N. Y. 
Supp. 107, which held that good will of the older company 
might be affected because a hat business and a retail 
clothing business were closely related. Bu,sh Ter1ninal 
Comparny v. Bush Terminal Trucking Co1npany, 206 N.Y. 
Supp. 2. These names were held to be confusing even 
though the companies were in different lines of business. 
At 66 A. L. R. 972 the rule as stated is "actual con-
fusion need not be shown, but it is sufficient to show that 
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confusion is probable or likely to occur. This rule is uni-
versally recognized. 
In the following cases the names were held to be so 
similar that relief was granted: 
Atlas Assur(UJII;ce Comparny- Atlas Insur(}jybce Com-
pany, 112 N. W. 232; Iowa. Auto Market- Auto Market 
and Exchange, 197 N. W. 321; Buick Motor Co.- Buick 
Used Motors, 229 N. Y. Supp. 3; M. M. N e~ucomer Com-
pan,y- Newcomer's New Store, 217 S. W. 822; Albany 
Savings Book- Albany City Savin,gs Bank, 190 N. Y. 
Supp. 334, both banks located in the same oity; Interna-
tional Trust Company- International Loa.n a.nd Trust 
Comparn.y, 26 N. E. 693, Mass.; Lloyd Bank, Limited-
Lloyds In~vestment Trust Company, 28 Times L. R. 379, 
England; Accident Insurance Company, Limited·- Acci-
dent, Disease, and General Insurance Corporation Lim-
ited, 54 L. J. Ch. N. S., England. The court indicated in 
this case that the result would probably have been dif-
ferent if the word ''accident'' was not the first word in 
each name; Armington & Sims Company- Armington & 
Sims Engine Comp·any, 42 Atl. 308, 27 A. L. R. 1024; B. 
Forman Compan~y ,_ Forman Manrufacturing Company, 
Inc. Here both companies dealt in the retailing of furs and 
the second companies proposed to establish its store only 
a few doors distance from that of the first company, 125 
N. Y. Supp. 597; Backus Oil Company- Backus Oil a;nd 
Car Grease Comp·any, 8 Ohio 93; Eureka Fire Hose Com-
p(JIYty- Eureka Rubber Manrufacturing Compa.ny, 60 Atl. 
561; Hudson Tire Company, Inc.·- Hudson Tire arnd Rub-
ber Compa;n.y, 276 F. 59; Kansas City Real Estate and 
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Stock Exchan.ge-Ka;n,s~s City Real Estate Exchan.ge, 5 
S. W. 29; Lamb Kn,it Goods Company-La.mb Glove arnd 
Mitten Comparny, 78 N. W.1072. Factories here were locat-
ed in different towns, but the business was done mainly 
through agents and there were many instances of confu-
sion; Materialmen's M erca;ntile Associated, Limited -
New York Materialmen's M erca.ntile Association,. Inc., 
155 N.Y. Supp. 706. Both businesses were located in New 
York and conducted by soliciting agents. The fact that . 
the offices were located in different parts of the city was 
held not to insure against confusion; McFell Electric Co.-
McFell Electric arnd Telephone Co., 110 Ill. App. 182; 
lVIcVey Seed & Floral Co.- G. B. McVey & Sons Seed 
Comp~a.ny, Inc., 79 So.116 ·; Pa;nsy Waist Company- Pansy 
Dress Co., 196 N. Y. Supp. 825; Plarnters' Fertilizer & 
Phospha.te Co.- Planters' Fertilizer Co., 133 S. E. 706; 
Un~ted States Mercantile Reporting & Collecting Associa-
tion - Un~ted States Mercarntile Reporting Comparny, 21 
Abb. 115 N. Y.; Van Aucken Steam Specialty Co.- Van 
Aucken, Company, 57 Ill. App. 240; King's Seafood- King 
of the Sea, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 702; Empire Trust Company-
Empire Financ-e Corporation, 41 S. W. 2d 847; America.n 
Radio Stores, Inc.- Am,erican Radio db Television Stores 
Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 127, 150 A. 180, where the court ob~ 
served that the words "radio" and "stores" were purely 
descriptive and so not appropriable, but the addition 
of the word ''American'' '""as a distinguishing mark, 
in the use of which claimant was entitled to be pro-
tected; Barber & Co., Inc.- Barber Co., Inc., 277 N. Y. 
55, 12 N. E. 2d 790, 115 A. L. R. 1236; Churchill Downs, 
In,c. ·-Churchill Downs Distilling Co., 90 S. W. 2d 1041; 
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b,conon~y Food Products Co.- Economy Grocery Stores 
Corp., 183 N. E. 49. The court held the names were 
too similar, but denied relief on the ground of laches; 
Home Jn,sulation Co.- Home & Building Insulation 
Co., 32 P. 2d 1065, Okla.; Peerless Laundry Co.-
Peerless Service Lawndry, Inc., 161 Atl. 832; Personal Fi-
nance Comparny of Lincoln- Personal Loan Service, 275 
N. W. 324, Nebr.; Standard Oil Co. of Calif.- Starndard Oil 
Co. of New Mexico, 56 F. 2d 973, CCA lOth. The court ob-
served that there could be no doubt that if defendant 
were permitted to engage in the petroleum business, third 
persons would deal with defendant thinking they were 
dealing with plaintiff; Standard Oil Co. of New Y ark-
Standard Oil Co. of Maine, 45 F. 2d 309, CCA 1. 
None of the titles in the cases cited by appellant are 
particularly similar. Certainly they are not as similar as 
those involved here and illustrated by the citations quoted 
above. A possible exception is the case of Federal Securi-
ties Company v. Federal Securities Corporation,. 276 Pac. 
1100 (Ore.). This is an old case, having been decided in 
1929. The trial court found that the plaintiff's business 
was practically all retail while the defendant's business 
was practically all wholesale. It also appeared that when 
the Commissioner observed that confusion might arise 
through the similarity of defendant's name with that of 
plaintiff, the defendant readily acquiesced in his sugges-
tion that the words ''of Illinois'' be added to its name. 
This addition certainly points up a distinction. 
An explanation is in order as to why respondent did 
not attempt to prove damages. This failure to prove 
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damages is not fatal as indicated in the cases cited aboveo 
The chief reason in this case for not attempting to prove 
them arose from the following set of circumstances. Ob-
viously the amount and extent of interference must be 
proved from the books and records of appellant. The 
records that would best illustrate this would be loan appli-
cations which resulted in approval or denial of loans, 
inasmuch as these records would show whether or not loan 
applicants had been previous customers of respondent. 
In the answer of appellant to respondent's interrogatories 
they reported that this information was not available. 
Plaintiff's interrogatory No. 12 (R. 11) asked for this 
information. The answer was ''None that we know of.'' 
(R. 24) Toward the end of the trial, however, appellant's 
manager, Mr. Gibbs, indicated that this information was 
available when he testified that he kept all applications 
whether they resulted in loans or not from six to twelve 
months. (R. 169) His reason for not presenting these 
records appears to be that it would have necessitated his 
going through some 1200 loan pockets besides the applica-
tions that had been turned down. (R. 170-171) Counsel for 
respondent was justified in assuming that the answers to 
interrogatories were correct. 1\Ir. Gibbs' testimony indi-
cated these answers were in error during the last few 
minutes of the trial. 
Respondent was and is prepared to expend a large 
sum of money in acquiring ne"\v licenses and advertising, 
and are unwilling to do so when the result would benefit 
its competitor, the appellant herein. The only other alter-
native, if this projected means of doing buiness is under-
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taken, is to change the name of the respondent. If this 
were done, respondent would lose the good will created 
by its name which was created by 28 years of service to 
hundreds of customers. So, if the trial court is not sus-
tained, future damage to respondent is a certainty. 
Finally, the reason it is not necessary to prove dam-
ages in this type of action in order to prevail, is that 
arriving a.t an amount that is anywhere near correct and 
which is not highly speculative is practically impossible. 
Appellant argues that because the Bank Commis-
sioner of the State of Utah p.ermitted the change of name 
from Credit Finance Plan to Budget Loan and Finance 
Plan, that they are entitled to continue business in that 
name. It asks this court to presume that a.n investigation 
"\Vas made by the Commissioner. There is no evidence that 
an investigation was made and the fact is that there was 
not. Matters involving unfair trade practice are admin-
istered by the courts generally, and in some particular 
instances by commissions set up for this sole purpose. 
This type of matter is no concern of public authorities 
vested with the power to issue licenses or permits. It is 
universally held that the granting of a charter or cer-
tificate of incorporation or license does not entitle one 
party to use a trade name to the detriment of another 
using a similar name. 66 A.L.R. 1014, 115 A.L.R. 1252. 
Some point is also made that Mr. Barker abandoned 
the name ''Budget Finance.'' The only business he did 
in this name was flooring a few cars and this particular 
company had no lending license and did not have a bank 
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account. (R. 56) The positive testimony of Mr. Barker is 
that by filing affidavits he intended to protect the word 
"Budget." (R. 57) There was no question of abandon-
ment involved in this case. No issue was made on this sub-
ject in the pleadings or pretrial order. The positive 
evidence is exactly to the contrary as evidenced by the 
option to purchase the stock of Budget System, (Ex. P-1) 
wherein Mr. Barker warrants the exclusive use of the 
name in the State of Utah for a consideration of $6,000. 
The fact of abandonment depends upon the intent of the 
person involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Practically all the testimony submitted in behalf of 
respondent had as its purpose the sustaining of Findings 
of Fact numbers 11 and 12. Respondent's evidence in sup-
port of these two Findings of Fact was also supported by 
the manager of appellant, and by the legal counsel of 
appellant. The only real issue in this case is whether the 
similarity of names has resulted in confusion or is likely 
to result in confusion. The manager of appellant freely 
admitted that when the signs were put on the building 
confusion commenced. Counsel for appellant admitted in 
writing that the use of the word ''Budget'' had been ''pre-
empted'' by respondent's predecessor in title in the Salt 
Lake area. There is no evidentiary conflict on the real 
issue in this case. Appellant attempts to initiate such a 
conflict by argument. 
This particular case involves a factor not usually 
found in this type of litigation. The evidence is uncon-
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tradicted that respondent has available a considerable 
amount of money which it intends to use to expand its 
business. It has been unable to do so for more than a 
year because of the insistence of appellant in continuing 
to use a similar name. Pecuniary injury, therefore, has 
developed since the institution of this litigation, and par-
ticularly since judgment was rendered in the trial court. 
Appellant has posted a bond pursuant to the order of the 
court for the purpose of staying its execution and secur-
ing the payment of damages and injury pending this 
appeal. (R. 191) 
There being no disagreement as to the facts that war-
rant the conclusion of the trial court, it is respectfully 
submitted that its judgment should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
· MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUJ\!I 
Attorneys for Respondent 
817 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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